猞猁
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加入时间: 2007/05/04
文章: 106
经验值: 3321
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作者：猞猁 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
1992年, 戈尔在演讲中这样说：
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| In pursuit of that objective, the Reagan-Bush administration would overlook the fact that it was an Iraq-based group that masterminded the assassination attempt against Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, which occurred in June of 1982. This event, of course, triggered Israel's invasion of Lebanon, not exactly a minor consequence for US policy. The Reagan-Bush administration was also prepared to overlook the fact that the terrorists who masterminded the attack on the Achille- Lauro and the savage murder of American Leon Klinghoffer, fled with Iraqi assistance. Nor did it seem to matter that the team of terrorists who set out to blow up the Rome airport came directly from Baghdad with suitcase bombs... |
首先要说明一点,美国对伊拉克WMD的指控并不是什么“谎言”,理由如下：
1.所谓谎言, 是指故意传布自己不相信的信息。伊拉克拥有过WMD，多次使用过WMD，在91年到97年之间数次被迫承认自己瞒报了WMD。98年跟联合国检查团终止合作之后，受到联合国决议的强烈谴责(如果大家都相信它已经没有WMD，那还查什么?)。克林顿在讲话里称它和国际恐怖组织组成了邪恶轴心（unholy axis）, 对它把WMD交给恐怖组织的可能性深表忧虑("I say this not to frighten you")——是的，小布什几乎没什么新东西，都是从克林顿一家照抄的，连那句著名的“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”也无非是紧跟希拉里大婶9月12日的讲话精神而已——要相信这么多人和组织长期坚持同一个慌言，那么你多半是三鹿奶粉K多了。。
2.到06年为止，找到了大约500件化武。运载工具方面的违规就更不必说了。
3.国会授权(H.J.Res.114)攻伊的理由大多数还是站得住脚的——
1)萨达姆拥有发展WMD所需的知识、能力和意图(请看Duelfer报告)。他贿赂法俄等大国以便瓦解经济制裁机制，战前它的计划已经接近成功, 此后就要大干一场；
2)它支持形形色色的国际恐怖主义组织（别扯萨达姆是什么“世俗化的反恐斗士”，自己去看看国务院20年来的支恐国家名单，还有1991年联合国决议里面的恐怖主义相关条款）
3)萨达姆破坏停火协定, 不但拒绝在监督之下销毁WMD, 甚至频繁向维持禁飞区的联军开火。
4)老生常谈的人权问题(UNSCR 688)。还有1998年的解放伊拉克法案。
5)为了伤害董鼎山之流五毛愤老的感情。
萨达姆和恐怖主义
关于萨达姆资助的恐怖组织，我们不说那些名字拗口的了，就以哈马斯为例，你可以先看一则BBC的报道。
然后，你如果退一步，认为萨达姆是个“世俗性”的领导人，因而他支持的恐怖组织也一定是“世俗性”的（即民族主义的组织，以夺走以色列的国土为目标，并不以推行伊斯兰法为目标）、他决不会跟原教旨主义团体有牵连——那么，请你先到国务院官网上查一下哈马斯属于“俗恐”还是“教恐”——或者再退一步，我们就当哈马斯本身不是原教旨主义组织好了(虽然Powell同志在讲话中另有意见)，那么请问，给它撑腰的是谁？当然是那个“伊朗伊斯兰共和国”，现在的媒体都承认伊朗是哈马斯主要的军火供应者（有的人说是支国，不过恐怕还是要伊朗作中间人）——你要是不相信当前的新闻报导，我们可以看看美国情报分析部门多年前对哈马斯的介绍(或者看1992年国务院反恐报告)。
回过头来梳理一下，哈马斯长期受伊朗支持，而萨达姆又对它公开资助，如果你还要坚持认为萨达姆这样的“世俗”政权不可能跟“原教旨”合作（即使它们暂时有共同的敌人和战略目标），似乎就说不过去了（这等于说叙利亚那个世俗性政权不可能跟德黑兰的代理人真主党合作）。当然你还可以把“合作”的含义定得很窄，下面我再举个例子, 或许有人认为哈马斯被归于恐怖组织不公平, 反而应该给它的领导人颁发那个炸药和平奖，我干脆就以基地组织为例吧。
请看2000年CIA给国会的报告，不要看伊拉克那个条目(因为报告主题是WMD, 而我们谈的是恐怖主义，而且还不能是“俗恐”，必须是“教恐”，否则单纯拿出Abu Nidal组织或者胡狼卡洛斯就可以定论了），请点击苏丹部分，那里提到该国化学武器的来源时是这么说的
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| In the WMD arena, Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing chemical weapons and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well. |
你再看1999和1998这些更早年份的同一报告，都可以找到这一结论，那么伊拉克帮苏丹发展化学武器这件事说明了什么？那就要请克林顿同学来回答。(在轰炸希法制药厂之后)。
本拉登和当时苏丹政权的关系是公开的秘密，况且苏丹“议长”图拉比(Hassan al-Turabi)当时也在大力推行伊斯兰化，那个政权本身就是很原教旨很暴力很威胁西方社会安全的一个东西。.
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| Additionally, the U.S. has reliable intelligence that the bin Ladin network has been actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction -- including chemical weapons -- for use against United States interests. Therefore, the U.S. also attacked one facility in Sudan associated with chemical weapons and the bin Ladin network. This facility is located within a secured chemical plant in the northeast Khartoum area. U.S. intelligence over the past few months has indicated that the bin Ladin network has been actively seeking to acquire chemical weapons for use against United States interests. Bin Ladin has extensive ties to the Sudanese Government and its industrial sector. The U.S. is confident this Sudanese Government-controlled facility is involved in the production of chemical weapons agents. |
但是你会听说中情局一直认为世俗化的萨政权和原教旨的本拉登是“天然敌人”，很不可能“合作”——这就是我前面说的，他们在很窄的意义上使用“合作”这个词，也就是说，只有联合参与一次具体的恐怖袭击才叫“合作”，而其它形式的帮助——如宣传、资助、提供外交护照、支持其分支(例如Abu Sayyaf, 见ISGP-2003-00014100)、甚至给基地组织成员提供武器和军事技能训练。。。这些都不叫“合作”。
我不清楚为何中情局会采用这种表述方式，但他们的措辞的确误导了一大堆不学无术之徒。
要知道战后从伊政权的内部文件中获得了哪些信息，最好看看USJFCOM的06年报告和07年的这部]Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism，主流媒体拿这个东西打击布什，结果是搬起石头砸了自己的脚。(支国朋友上不去USJFCOM网站的话可以去Federation of American Scientists看这五卷报告)
友情提示，前一部报告请看该PDF文档的第71和72页，后一部就有多处可看了
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Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-Iraqi non-state actors was spread across a wide variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. For years, Saddam maintained training camps for foreign "fighters" drawn from these Perse groups. In some cases, particularly for Palestinians, Saddam was also a strong financial supporter. Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda's stated goals and objectives. |
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Some aspects of the indirect cooperation between Saddam's regional terror enterprise and al Qaeda's more global one are somewhat analogous to the Cali and Medellin drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national security concerns to the United States. Both cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective-expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The wellpublicized and violent rise of the Medellin cartel temporarily obscured and overshadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel. Recognizing Iraq as a second, or parallel, "terror cartel" that was simultaneously threatened by and somewhat aligned with its rival helps to explain the evidence emerging from the detritus of Saddam's regime. Based on captured recordings and documents, this paper illustrates in part how Saddam Hussein ran his "cartel." |
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In the years between the two Gulf Wars, UN sanctions reduced Saddam's ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's "coercion" toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power. Saddam nurtured this capability with an infrastructure supporting (1)his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2)the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and "outreach programs" for terrorist groups. Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces. |
最猛的是这一句
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Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organisations it knew to be part of al- Qa'ida, as long as that organisation's near-term goals supported Saddam's longterm vision. |
全文见
http://snowball5212.blog.hexun.com/28196221_d.html
作者：猞猁 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org |
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再论萨达姆、WMDs和恐怖组织
