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人有多大胆，地有多大产。祝贺创造5千万新纪录 。但俺认为有一亿 -- 随便 - (0 Byte) 2003-2-22 周六, 下午10:22 (204 reads) |
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作者：Anonymous 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
A Note on the Causal Factors of China'sFamine in 19591961Shujie YaoUniversity of PortsmouthI. Lost Population, Extra Deaths, and Lost BirthsCaused by the FamineIn a famine year, the negative impact on population growth can bemeasured by the number of extra deaths caused by hunger and thenumber of lost births caused by reduced fertility. Let EDtand LBtbe the number of extra deaths and the number of lost births, respec-tively, in yeart.ThenEDtPOPt1(ADRtEDRt)(1)andLBtPOPt1(ABRtEBRt),(2)where POPt1is the total population in the previous year; ADRtandEDRtare, respectively, the actual and expected death rates in yeart; and ABRtand EBRtare, respectively, the actual and expected birthrates in yeart.Expected death and birth rates are those that wouldhave prevailed if there had been no famine. In other words, thedifference between ADRtand EDRtis an increased death rate causedby starvation rather than natural wastage. The difference betweenABRtand EBRtis a lost birth rate caused by lost fertility as a resultof famine.The data and estimation of the expected growth rate, death rate,and birth rate for the famine period 195961 are available from theauthor on request. The actual growth, death, and birth rates are[Journal of Political Economy,1999, vol. 107, no. 6, pt. 1]1999 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/1999/10706-0009$02.501365
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1366journal of political economyTABLE 1Estimates of Lost Population, Extra Deaths, and Lost Births, 195961Estimates195919601961TotalA. Lost PopulationActual population (millions)672.070662.070658.590Expected growth rate (%)2.4032.4032.403Expected population (millions)675.800688.220677.980Expected losses (millions)3.73026.15019.39049.270B. Lost BirthsActual birth rate (%)2.9941.6211.297Expected birth rate (%)3.5123.5123.512Lost birth rate (%).5181.8912.215Lost births (millions)3.42012.71014.66030.790C. Extra DeathsActual death rate (%)1.1553.1091.823Expected death rate (%)1.1091.1091.109Increased death rate (%).0462.000.714Extra deaths (millions).30013.4404.74018.480Source.-State Statistical Bureau (1991), pp. 7980.Note.-The expected population in yeartis the actual population in the previous year multiplied by theexpected growth rate. The expected loss of population is the actual population minus the expected popula-tion. The lost birth rate is the actual birth rate minus the expected birth rate. Lost births are the productof the actual population in the previous year by the lost birth rate. The increased death rate is the actualdeath rate minus the expected death rate. Extra deaths are the product of the actual population in theprevious year multiplied by the increased death rate.taken from the State Statistical Bureau (1991). Table 1 presents theestimated lost population, extra deaths, and lost births.In total, there were 18.48 million extra deaths and 30.79 millionlost births in 195961. The estimated extra deaths were similar tothe estimates made by Peng (1987) and Chang and Wen (1997), butmuch less than that by Ashton et al. (1984) and quoted in Lin(1990). The estimated lost births were similar to the estimates madeby Ashton et al. About 73 percent of the extra deaths took place in1960 alone. The number of extra deaths in 1959 was only 310,000.Contrary to the claims of Ashton et al. (1984) and Chang and Wen(1997), the death toll in 1958 should be negligible.II. The Causal Factors of FamineThe great famine in China cannot be explained by a simple hypothe-sis of a nonrepetitive game as proposed by Lin (1990). The faminewas an evolutionary process activated and escalated by six interre-lated causal factors. The first three factors-namely, poor weather,wrong policies, and low production incentives-caused a sudden re-
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comment1367duction in domestic food production. The last three factors-namely, the near absence of a statistical and monitoring system, theinability to import grains, and international isolation-led to thefailure to respond to a food shortage. The interaction of these fac-tors, reinforced by three major political events, caused a prolongedand massive famine unprecedented in world history.A. Reduced Domestic Food ProductionGrain production dropped by 15 percent in 1959 from its peak of200 million tons in 1958. It declined by another 15 percent in 1960and stayed flat in 1961 (State Statistical Bureau 1991).Contrary to Lin's indictment, poor weather was an important fac-tor responsible for the poor harvest in 1959 and much more so inthe following two years. The average proportion of sown area hit bynatural disasters in 195961 more than doubled that in 194966,with 195961 excluded (Lin 1990, table 3). Ceteris paribus, thisshould explain a large proportion of the total loss of grain produc-tion in this period.Also contrary to Lin's argument, wrong policies did play an impor-tant role in depressing food production. At the beginning of 1958,farmers were forced to transplant rice seedlings with an unbelievablyhigh density as a means of raising yield. In the meantime, millionsof farmers were forced to make steel and engage in other industrialactivities at the expense of food production. The leadership mistak-enly believed that high planting density could raise yield. As a result,the sown area was reduced by 4.5 percent in 1958 and another 9.08percent in 1959 (Lin 1990, p. 1238, n.  .Poor weather and reduced acreage alone left little room for otherfactors to explain the sudden drop in grain production in 1959. In1960 and 1961, a further decline in grain output was accelerated byan unusually high proportion of sown area hit by natural disaster.The average proportion of sown areas hit by natural disasters was15.3 percent in 1960 and 18.6 percent in 1961, compared to an aver-age of 6.6 percent for the period 194966 (with 195961 excluded).Poor weather was a much more important factor responsible for areduction in output in 196061 than in 1959. Although sown acre-age rose by 5.52 percent in 1960 from 1959, total grain outputdropped by 15.59 percent, implying that the average yield in 1960was more than 21 percent less than in 1959.According to Lin's hypothesis, production incentives in 1960 musthave been roughly the same as in 1959 because in both years farmersdid not have rights to withdraw from the commune. Hence, thesharp reduction in yield in 1960 must have been largely attributable
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1368journal of political economyto poor weather. The situation in 1961 was similar to that in 1960.Although total grain output in 1961 was slightly higher than in 1960,it was still about 30 percent lower than the 1958 level. Therefore,Lin's criticisms of Eckstein (1966), Lardy (1978), Perkins and Yusuf(1984), and others were contradictory to the facts he quotes as em-pirical evidence to support such criticisms.B. Failure to Respond to the Food ShortageA large reduction in the production of domestic grain should nothave led to a long-lasting famine and severe mortality had the gov-ernment reacted promptly to the food shortage from the end of1958. There were three main factors responsible for the govern-ment's failure to respond to the food shortage: a near absence of astatistical reporting and monitoring system, the inability to importgrains, and international isolation.C. Political Struggles Reinforced the Causal Factorsfor FamineThere were a number of violent political events from 1949 to 1978.Three major events occurred before and during the famine period:the antirightist movement in 1957, the Great Leap Forward move-ment (the commune movement was a principal part of it) from1958, and the antireactionary movement after the severance of rela-tions with the USSR in 1960. The antirightist movement aimed toeliminate any resistance from academia and the intellectuals whodared to question any wrongdoing by the party leadership. The com-mune movement reduced work incentives, created conditions forwrongdoing and irrational production decisions, and set up commu-nal kitchens, depleting all available food stock within a short periodof time. Breaking up the relationship with the USSR, China becametotally isolated from the international community. In addition,China was forced to export large quantities of grain in 1959 and1960 to pay back debts owed to the USSR at the time when domesticfood production reached crisis levels.III. ConclusionsThis note estimates the loss of population and decomposes it intoextra deaths and lost births caused by the famine in 195961. Thefamine was an evolutionary process caused by a complicated set offactors and three major political struggles. A sharp decline in domes-tic food production by 15 percent in 1959 and another 15 percent
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comment1369in 196061 was due to poor weather, irrational policies, and lowincentives. Contrary to Lin's hypothesis, it is argued that poorweather and wrong policies played the most important role in reduc-ing grain production. My analysis supports the arguments byEckstein (1966), Lardy (1978), and others. The incentive issue wasimportant but not dominant. Furthermore, low agricultural produc-tivity was largely due to irrational decisions and wrong policies ofthe communist leadership rather than the lack of a self-enforcingagreement among the peasants as hypothesized by Lin.ReferencesAshton, Basil; Hill, Kenneth; Piazza, Alan; and Zeitz, Robin. ``Famine inChina, 195861.''Population and Development Rev.10 (December 1984):61345.Chang, Gene Hsin, and Wen, Guanzhong James. ``Communal Dining andthe Chinese Famine of 19581961.''Econ. Development and Cultural Change46 (October 1997): 134.Eckstein, Alexander.Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade:Implications for U.S. Policy.New York: McGraw-Hill (for Council ForeignRelations), 1966.Lardy, Nicholas R.Economic Growth and Distribution in China.Cambridge:Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978.Lin, Justin Yifu. ``Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 19591961.''J.P.E.98 (December 1990): 122852.Peng, Xizhe. ``Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward inChina's Provinces.''Population and Development Rev.13 (December 1987):63970.Perkins, Dwight H., and Yusuf, Shahid.Rural Development in China.Balti-more: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press (for World Bank), 1984.State Statistical Bureau.Statistical Yearbook of China.Beijing: Statistical Pub-lishing House, 1991.
作者：Anonymous 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org |
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